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Note:
Regulation of Municipal Solid Waste
Through Taxation: the New York
Recycling Incentive Tax
Solid waste is the stuff you leave on your curb at night.' Its dis-
posal is a growing problem for municipalities around the country,
and resolution of the problem is closely related to issues of energy,
resource conservation, health and urban finance.
Legislative response to the problem has been limited. Unlike air
and water pollution, solid waste has not yet attracted extensive or
direct federal regulation. Under the Solid Waste Disposal Act 2 the
government's role is essentially limited to research, coordination
and funding of state efforts. Nonetheless, there have been numerous
bills introduced in Congress dealing with various aspects of the
problem. 3 The states, too, have generally limited their role to co-
ordination and funding of municipal and regional disposal efforts.
Much of the emphasis has been on the hardware associated with
solid waste disposal. Oregon's ban on "no deposit" bottles' is an
exceptional effort to deal with the basic problem by eliminating a
major component of solid waste at the source. In New York City
comprehensive and controversial legislation was created to deal with
fundamental problems in the control of solid waste.
In 1971 the New York Recycling Incentive Tax (RIT) came and
went. An offspring of the New York City Environmental Protection
Administration (NYC EPA), the RIT was an attempt to use the
city's taxing power to influence the quantity and composition of
municipal solid waste. The RIT as originally conceived and au-
thorized by the state legislature consisted of taxes on containers
made of rigid or semi-rigid paperboard, fibre, glass, metal or plastic.
The tax on each material was to correspond roughly to the degree
1. Agricultural and industrial wastes, although often solid waste, present far
different problems and require a different solution than that discussed here.
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3251-3259 (1970).
3. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 1377 and S. 3058 Betore the Subcomm. on the
Environment of the Comm. on Commerce, 92nd Cong. 2nd Sess., ser. 92-60 (1971).
4. Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 459.810-.890 (1973).
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of difficulty and expense of disposal. Thus paper containers were to
be taxed at one cent each while metal containers were to be taxed
at two cents. The tax was to allow credits where specified amounts
of recycled materials were used in manufacturing the containers or if
a sufficient number of the containers were reused. Each container
was to be taxed separately, so that a tube within a box would have
a double tax. To reduce economic hardship, purchases by industry
and containers for pharmaceuticals and foodstuffs were exempt.
The tax had a brief and bizarre existence. The RIT as passed by
the New York City Council taxed only plastic containers, despite
the fact that its effectiveness and original design apply to all types
of containers. Authorized by the state in June, 1971, it was declared
unconstitutional by a lower New York court in November of the
same year. The decision was never appealed.
The RIT is an extremely original and creative piece of legislation
dealing with a wide variety of problems. This note will examine
some of the problems that existed when the tax was conceived and
how the tax sought to resolve them. It will then discuss the legal
and economic appropriateness of a RIT.
THE PROBLEM
New York is full of solid waste. Although the statistics take a
variety of forms, they all indicate that the problem is enormous.
- In 1970, NYC disposed of 22,000 tons of refuse per day.
In 1980, NYC will dispose of 32,000 tons of refuse per day.-
- In 1961, each person produced 4.1 pounds of refuse per day.
In 1971, each person produced 5.5 pounds of refuse per day.6
-The budget of the Dept. of Sanitation in 1971 was $176.3
million. 7
The cost of solid waste management in the city in 1970/71 was
$268.5 million.8
- Solid waste management ranks seventh among state and local
public expenditures nationally.9
5. A Recycling Incentive Tax. A study prepared by McKinsey & Co. for the
Bureau of the Budget, New York City, at 1-1 (November, 1971) [hereinafter cited as
McKinsey].
6. Hearings on S. 1377 and S. 3058 Before the Subcomm. on the Environment
of the Comm. on Commerce, 92nd Cong. 2nd Sess., ser. 92-60, Report by Carolyn
Brancato, Staff Economist, New York City EPA, at 133 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
Brancato].
7. Id. at 138.
8. McKinsey, supra note 5, at 1-1.
9. id.
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The figures are important in that they indicate two things. First,
the problem of solid waste management results in a significant
municipal expense. Second, the trend of the problem is increasing.
Although the population of the city remains constant, the amount
of waste is increasing at about 5% per year."0 The increase in solid
waste correlates closely with the increase in the Gross National
Product," and one can infer some causal relationship between
greater wealth and greater waste.
Approximately 40% of the municipal solid waste load is composed
of containers. 12 For a variety of reasons including its large percent-
age, amenability to recycling and ease of taxation the NYC EPA
chose containers as the object of the tax. It is estimated that out of
the $15,865 million annual unit sales of containers in New York City
in 1970, approximately 66% were of paperboard, 17% were of metal,
9% were of glass, 8% were of plastic and a small amount was of
wood.' 3 But figures in this area may be confusing. While plastics
may make up 8% of the total number of containers in New York
City, they comprise about 6.1% of containers by weight and 12.6%
by volume.'" In the total solid waste load plastics are about 1.5% by
weight and 3% by volume.1
If nothing else is clear, it is apparent that change in the composi-
tion of waste is occurring. Plastics are increasing their share of the
solid waste load relative to glass while aluminum is increasing rela-
tive to steel. The Department of Commerce, for the period 1970-80,
estimates that in the container market paper will increase from 3-
5% per year, glass and metal will increase from 6-7% per year and
plastics will increase at 10% per year." Test marketing of plastic
bottles by Pepsi and Coco-Cola threaten an enormous expansion
of the amount and percentage of plastics with which the city will
have to deal.
One final trend is important. Just as the total quantity of solid
10. Kretchmer, Statement in opposition to motion for preliminary injunction,
Society of the Plastics Industry, Inc. v. City of New York, 68 Misc. 2d 366, 326
N.Y.S.2d 788 (Sup. Ct. 1971) [hereinafter cited as Kretchmer].
11. Brancato, supra note 6, at 133.
12. McKinsey, supra note 5, at 3-2.
13. Id. at C-2.
14. Kretchmer, supra note 10.
15. Id.
16. Brancato, supra note 6, at 138.
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waste is increasing, the per capita production of container waste is
also increasing. In 1958 each person used 404 pounds of containers;
in 1976 it is estimated that that figure will rise to 661 pounds.
1 7
This is a truly alarming figure, and this gross expansion in our in-
dividual consumption of packaging is reflected in inflated costs of
goods. 12.7% of the cost of cosmetics is for packaging, almost 13€
out of every dollar spent. For cookies the figure is 10.2%, for deter-
gents it is 8.9% while for televisions and other major appliances the
figure is only 0.6%."8 While this, in part, reflects the fact that as the
price of the item increases the percentage of cost attributable to
packaging should decrease, there must be other forces at work.
These forces range from consumer preferences, to cost benefits from
sophisticated packaging, and they will be considered below when
the economics of the RIT is discussed.
Currently, the overwhelming response to this mammoth solid
waste problem is to burn it or bury it. Approximately 30.8% of New
York garbage was incinerated in 1971; the rest was disposed of in
sanitary landfills.' 9 With the rapid exhaustion of available landfill
sites, a disposal gap of 63 million tons is threatened by 1985.20
Difficulties in-adequately coping with the problem arise not only
as a result of the increasing quantities of waste but also because of
technological difficulties associated with its composition.
THE RECYCLING INCENTIvE TAX*
The Recycling Incentive Tax was a comprehensive plan designed
to deal with many of the preceding problems. As originally con-
ceived the tax would have the following characteristics:
Tax per container Paperboard 1¢
Metal 2¢





18. Id. at 136-37.
19. Kretchmer, supra note 10.
20. McKinsey, supra note 5, at 1-1.
* See Appendices.
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If made of a combination of materials a container would be taxed
at the highest tax rate of its constituent materials with plastics to be
taxed at 30. The RIT also provides a tax credit of 10 if
-paper containers are composed of 80% recycled materials
-metal containers are composed of 40% recycled materials
-glass containers are composed of 30% recycled materials
-plastic containers are composed of 30% recycled materials, or
-60% of containers of a distinct type are reused.
Non-retail sales are exempt, thus removing the tax from industry.
Pharmaceuticals and foodstuffs are also exempt, although beverages
and candies would be taxed.
The tax would be administered by a local board with power to
modify the existing tax rates and create new classifications in re-
sponse to changes in the difficulty of disposal of materials. The tax
would be levied on the supplier who sells to the retailer. If this sup-
plier had no business situs within the city then the retailer would
be responsible for the tax, although the foreign supplier would be
allowed to pay instead of the retailer. The taxpayer would have the
obligation of keeping adequate records and would have a prima
facie obligation to pay the base rates associated with the containers.
Tax credits would be obtained by application and appropriate doc-
umentation would be required.
Taken together the provisions of the RIT should produce a variety
of results.
Reduction in volume of waste. This is perhaps the most critical
objective of a solid waste management policy for any city with a
population as large as New York's. With the growing shortage of
landfill sites, a reduction in the amount of material is imperative.
Furthermore, the vast majority of money spent on solid waste man-
agement goes for the collection of the refuse. It cost New York City
$27.50/ton for collection, $6.50-$10.00/ton for treatment and- $2-
$3/ton for disposal of incinerator refuse.2 A proposal which could
reduce solid waste volume at its source reduces expenses at all levels.
The RIT promotes the reduction of volume in at least two ways.
First, by taxing each container separately the trend towards multiple
21. Kretchmer, supra note 10.
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and unnecessary packaging might be halted. Second, since each
container regardless of size would be taxed the same amount, larger
containers would be taxed proportionately less. Large containers
are more efficient in that the ratio of goods to packaging is lower.
Increased purchases of larger containers would result in a reduction
in volume of waste.
Encourage recycling. An increase in recycling means a reduction
in the final volume of waste to be disposed of by incineration or
landfill, but it does not represent a decrease in the cost of collection.
Recycling, of course, has the approved advantages of preservation
of resources. It saves not only virgin materials but also energy. It
takes much less energy to produce aluminum from recycled scraps
than from ore. Furthermore, if there were a vital "secondary ma-
terials" market the city could recoup some of its expense in handling
solid waste by selling the refuse.
There is no conspiracy against recycled materials except for the
market place and, to be sure, a powerful virgin materials industry.
A number of economic factors combine to price recycled materials
out of the present market. These include inadequate sorting tech-
nology which makes recycled goods expensive to acquire, discrimin-
atory tax and freight rates which favor virgin materials, and cheap
energy. But the problem is "only money." Since the RIT provides
credits for the use of recycled materials an "artificial" demand
would be created. Given this increased demand the market for re-
cycled goods should flourish. Forces are already at work which
mandate an increased use of recycled materials. As energy costs in-
crease, virgin materials become scarcer and recycling technology
improves recycling must increase. The RIT would compliment and
facilitate this shift.
Modify composition of solid waste. To the extent that some
materials are taxed at a lower rate than others there is an incentive
in the system to switch materials. This is extremely important.
Some materials present much more difficulty to a recycling pro-
gram than others. Multi-material containers are much more difficult
to recycle. The metal rings on glass bottles with twist off caps can
ruin a shipment of glass to be recycled. The trend towards the use
of more complex materials in packaging is growing. The RIT
provides an incentive to use more easily recyclable materials.
Plastics present unique problems to the municipal incinerator.
Burning at a far higher temperature than other materials they re-
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quire greater amounts of oxygen. They produce hot spots and yield
greater amounts of particulate matter. An increasing proportion of
plastics contain polyvinyl chloride which when burned produces
hydrochloric acid. This damages the walls of the incinerators and
destroys air pollution devices. Per unit they are far more difficult to
deal with than other components of solid waste and are posing
problems to the design of more efficient new incinerators. The
problem, while not acute now, looms large due to the trends in the
use of plastic. The RIT by providing a disincentive to use plastic
fights this trend.
Promote use of reusable bottles. Through a tax credit the RIT
attempts to encourage the use of reusable, deposit bottles. Unlike
a mandatory deposit law the RIT provides no direct incentive to
the consumer to return bottles. Rather, this provision only hopes
to stabilize the current use of returnable bottles in New York and
through a more pronounced price advantage prevent the total phase
out of these bottles.
Exploit environmental sentiment. While not a part of the RIT as
conceived it would be easy to require conspicious labelling of the
recycled materials content in order to qualify for tax credits. In ad-
dition to price advantage, it is hoped that the public would re-
spond to this information and that buying patterns would be altered.
This would be an additional incentive to the supplier to use con-
tainers composed of recycled materials.
Production of revenue. Lost in the farsighted objectives of the
RIT is the more mundane fact that the tax would also produce
substantial revenue for a city. It was estimated that the initial tax
yield for New York City would be $30-$50 million per year.22 If the
objectives of the tax were fulfilled, however, this would not be
maintained. As manufacturers responded to the incentives in the
tax the revenue would be reduced and the composition of the solid
waste stream would change. At some point equilibrium would be
established and revenue would then grow with the market.
Apart from the direct production of revenue the tax would have
two other effects on the city budget. If effective the tax would
result in lowered expenditures for solid waste collection and dis-
posal. Furthermore, as the tax created a market for recycled goods
the city would be able to raise money by selling its wastes.
22. Brancato, supra note 6, at 162.
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LEGAL ANALYSIS
In Society of the Plastics Industry, Inc. v. City of New York 28 a
New York Supreme Court24 found that the container tax as passed
by the New York City Council violated the state enabling act and
was unconstitutional both on equal protection and due process
grounds. Although the court's conclusions as to the constitutionality
of the tax were questionable at best, the decision was never ap-
pealed. Furthermore, the court's decision dealt primarily with prob-
lems associated with New York's limited application of the tax to
plastic containers. The fundamental concept of the RIT was not
impuned. If the RIT were passed in its complete form, it is likely
that it would be able to withstand constitutional attack.
Those issues relevant to the RIT as a whole will be considered
first. Then the issues raised only in connection with the New York
City version will be discussed.
Recycling Incentive Tax
The fundamental challenge to the RIT comes from the Commerce
Clause of the United States Constitution. 5 In granting Congress
the power to regulate interstate commerce, the Commerce Clause
was an attempt to insure that the United States would have a na-
tional economy. It sought to avoid those internal restraints which
the states, under the Articles of Confederation, had imposed in order
to protect their local economies. This tension between local regula-
tion and federal power has never been resolved and has been a chief
source of litigation rising from the Constitution.
It is obvious that there is conflict of state and federal powers over
regulation of commerce. Unfortunately neither a resolution nor even
an analysis of the problem is quite so obvious. Tests and catchwords
which courts have evolved in attempts to simplify analysis have
done the opposite. Direct-indirect,26 unduly burdensome, 7 national
uniformity is required,28 and balance of interests2 have not led to
23. 68 Misc. 2d 366, 326 N.Y.S.2d 788 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
24. The New York Supreme Court is a court of original jurisdiction.
25. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
26. DiSanto v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34 (1927).
27. Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
28. Cooley v. Board of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia, 53 U.S. (12 How.)
299 (1851).
29. Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
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clarification of the enormous and complex problem. Justice Frank-
furter, in reference to similar problems in state taxation, wrote that
"to attempt to harmonize all that has been said in the past would
neither clarify what has gone before nor guide the future."' Some
particular approaches have, nonetheless, emerged.
Analysis of the Commerce Clause begins with the threshold ques-
tion of whether Congress "preempted" the field. The concept is
derived as much from the Supremacy Clause 3' as the Commerce
Clause. Under Commerce Clause preemption however, not only are
states prohibited from passing laws inconsistent with federal laws
but also from passing laws, consistent or not, in areas in which the
federal government has assumed exclusive control.
Where Congress has passed regulations in a field, the courts will
attempt to find a Congressional intention regarding preemption. In
the absence of an explicit declaration, the courts may infer inten-
tion. In Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.32 the United States Supreme
Court recognized circumstances when the inference was appropriate.
Federal preemption would be found
1) if federal regulation was so pervasive in an area that it was
possible to infer a Congressional intention to prohibit state
regulation, or
2) if the federal regulation involved an area of dominant federal
interest, or
3) if the state policy produced a result inconsistent with the
objective of the federal regulation.
The attempt to ascribe intention where none may ever have existed
has produced results which are not altogether consistent.3
Even where there is extensive federal regulation, courts will val-
idate concurrent state regulation where Congress has indicated that
state action is proper. In Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of
Detroit3 l4 the Supreme Court upheld a municipal air pollution
ordinance which created real difficulties for ships using the docks.
Although there were comprehensive federal safety requirements
which fixed certain standards for ships boilers, a local air pollution
law which also affected the operation of the boilers was not held
30. Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 252 (1946).
31. U.S. CONST. art VI.
32. 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
33. Compare Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297 (1961) with Florida Lime and
Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
34. 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
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to be preempted. The court found that Congress had specifically
stated that air pollution control was primarily a responsibility of
state and local government. While the dissent pointed out a previous
court ruling which had invalidated local laws based on much the
same facts, the majority advised that courts "enjoin seeking out con-
flicts between state and federal regulation where none clearly
exists."
3 5
It was suggested in the Society of the Plastics Industry litigation
that the Federal Solid Waste Disposal Act preempted the field of
solid waste regulation, but the court, while interested, did not rule
on the problem. The plaintiffs quoted a statement of Congressional
policy that "the problems of waste disposal.., have become a
matter national in scope."36 They did not, however, note that in the
same sentence Congress recognized "collection and disposal of solid
wastes should continue to be primarily the function of state, regional
and local agencies." The federal role is confined to financial and
technical assistance. Not only is local regulation not preempted, the
federal EPA is to "encourage the enactment of improved and, so far
as practicable, uniform state and local laws governing solid waste
disposal."37 While it might be possible to draw a distinction between
laws relating to production of solid waste and those regulating dis-
posal, this has not been done. In the recent litigation over the
Oregon mandatory deposit law, 38 the issue of preemption was not
even raised.
Where Congress is silent in a field or where there is otherwise no
determination of preemption, further analysis is necessary. First,
the local regulation must be based on a legitmate state power. 9 In
almost all cases in this area it is the police powers which form the
basis of the regulation. Solid waste management is clearly within
the area of health and safety with which the police powers deal.4"
State regulations which discriminate against non-resident business
have been invalidated under the Commerce Clause. 4 It is this
35. Id. at 446.
36. 42 U.S.C. § 3251(a)(6) (1970).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 3254 (1970).
38. American Can Co. v. Oregon Liquor Control Commission, 517 P.2d 691 (Ore.
App. 1973).
39. See, Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
40. See, American Can Co. v. Oregon Liquor Control Commission, 517 P.2d
691, 698 (Ore. App. 1973).
41. See, Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
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threat which was perhaps fundamental to the creation of the Com-
merce Clause. Courts have been particularly frightened by the lack
of checks and balances on a state legislature which is regulating
out of state concerns. There might be little pressure in opposition
to restrictions. For this reason the concept of "inner political checks"
seems important.42 Where there is opposition to the regulation from
groups within the state the problem of discriminatory regulation is
less keenly felt.43
It was argued that the RIT was discriminatory and favored local
suppliers. Since retailers were responsible for the tax if their sup-
pliers were from out of the city, it was thought that this would en-
courage local retailers to deal with local suppliers. In fact the
authors of the tax hoped that this would occur and provide an
impetus to local industry. The court, however, ruled that this effect
was not sufficient to declare the tax unconstitutional. It noted that
this technique for administration of the tax was not unique and that
other taxes, such as the gasoline tax, had successfully employed it.
There are further reasons for finding that the RIT is not dis-
criminatory. First, the motivation of the tax is clearly nondiscrimina-
tory. In the New York litigation, neither party disputed that the pur-
pose of the tax was the control of solid waste and the encourage-
ment of recycling, both valid state interests. Furthermore, there are
pronounced political checks within the state. The tax imposes bur-
dens on suppliers, retailers and consumers alike. Of course if an
RIT were enacted from the federal level, these concerns would be
moot.
State regulations which are otherwise appropriate will be stricken
if they "unduly burden" interstate commerce. In Southern Pacific
Co. v. Arizona14 the Supreme Court voided a law which limited the
length of trains that could pass through the state. Although the
regulation was for safety purposes the Court found that the dif-
ficulty of stopping and reforming trains at the state border was too
great to be allowed. They were helped in this conclusion by their
finding that the law created more danger than it cured. The regula-
tion was therefore "unduly burdensome."
The RIT is minimally burdensome on interstate commerce. The
42. See, Note, State Environmental Protection Legislation and the Commerce
Clause, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1762 (1974).
43. But see, Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
44. 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
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only burdens that the plaintiffs could.point to were the problems of
record keeping by the local merchants. This element of record keep-
ing is not unique to the RIT, and a court should not hold that it is
unduly burdensome. A greater problem is the possibility that manu-
facturers might have to design different containers for different
markets. This could be the result of inconsistent legislation in vary-
ing jurisdictions. The Supreme Court has suggested that the mere
possibility of inconsistent regulations is not sufficient4 5 although
they have acted where state laws have been in actual conflict. 6
Even in the earliest cases dealing with the interpretation of the
Commerce Clause the courts have suggested that when the nature
of the regulation requires national uniformity state actions will be
prohibited.4" It is hard to deny that the RIT would be more effective
if it were enacted at a national or state level. The minimal leverage
of the New York market is the tax's greatest weakness. Furthermore,
a national tax would avoid any problems of inconsistent state laws.
Several considerations, however, argue for the retention of a RIT
at local levels. First, Congress has recognized that the problem of
solid waste management is local. While it recognized the possibility
of inconsistent state laws, Congress limited its role to that of co-
ordination. Second, the goals which the RIT promote, a reduction
in quantity of solid waste and the encouragement of recycling, will
presumably be shared by all the states. Any inconsistencies would
not be fundamental. Finally, to a limited extent it is proper for dif-
ferent states and localities to have different laws. Their needs are
different. An urban area might wish to discourage organic wastes
since they produce health problems. A rural area with great collec-
tion problems might want to discourage non-degradable containers.
Glass and plastic, like diamonds, are forever. Paper and metal will
naturally decompose. Different areas have differing capacities to
absorb recycled materials. New York might have little use for tin
cans whereas mining states might find a ready market for them to
be used to leach ore.
In the final analysis the courts must consider the relevant factors
and attempt to balance the interests involved. Where the state in-
45. Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
46. See, Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
47. See, Cooley v. Board of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia, 53 U.S. (12
How.) 299 (1851), accord, Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624
(1973).
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terest is greater than the burden on interstate commerce the state
regulation will be allowed. There should be little question that the
RIT is a valid state regulation under the Commerce Clause.
An analysis of state taxation under the Commerce Clause involves
some different considerations than that of state regulations. The
courts have been concerned with problems of multiple tax burdens
on companies, and they have required an adequate connection be-
tween the taxpayer and the state.4 Although the RIT was explicitly
ruled a regulation by the New York court the Recycling Incentive
Tax qua tax is clearly valid. The taxing provisions are reflected in
other taxes which have been sustained.49
New York City RIT
The RIT when it emerged from the New York City Council con-
sisted of a tax solely on plastic containers, and certain legal prob-
lems were litigated concerning this limited version of the tax. Al-
though they are not directed at the basic concept of the RIT, two
problems will be considered briefly.
The New York Supreme Court ruled that the city tax deviated
from the state enabling legislation and was therefore invalid. Mao
said that all power grows out of the barrel of a gun, but for New
York City all power grows out of Albany. In a system of federal
and state authority municipalities have no taxing power save that
which is given them by states.50 It is for this reason that the ena-
bling act was a necessary prerequisite to the passage of the local
container tax.
The enabling act authorized a tax on containers made of rigid
or semi-rigid paperboard, fibre, glass, metal, plastic or any com-
bination of such materials. In selecting only plastic as the basis for
the tax the court held that New York City was improperly utilizing
the authority. In Glen Cove Theatres, Inc. v. City of Glen Cove5'
the New York Supreme Court invalidated a local tax on movie
tickets. The enabling legislation had indicated that it was to be an
amusement tax applicable to certain classes of establishments in-
48. See, National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753
(1967).
49. See, e.g., McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33
(1940).
50. See, Rhyne, Municipal Law, 667, sec. 28-1 (1957).
51. 36 Misc. 2d 772, 233 N.Y.S.2d 972 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
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cluding theatres, bowling alleys, cabarets, and roof gardens. The
court said that the relevant consideration was whether the legisla-
ture had intended that the city be able to pick and choose. They
found that the legislature had not so intended. Commenting on this
decision a former New York State Tax Commissioner wrote that it
was the policy of the state tax commission to advise municipalities
that they were often in the position of having to take all or nothing
of authorized taxes22
Arguments might be made about the intention of the legislature
when they passed the enabling act for the RIT, but none are neces-
sary. The obvious solution to this problem would be for the City
Council to pass the RIT in its complete form.
A second problem with the New York City RIT on plastic con-
tainers lies in the Equal Protection Clauses of the Federal and State
Constitutions. 53 It is clear that states are capable of creating clas-
sifications in order to effectuate a legitimate interest. Some items
might be taxed while others are not; some objects might be regu-
lated while others are not.
But there is a point beyond which the state cannot go without
violating the Equal Protection Clause. The state must proceed
upon a rational basis and may not resort to a classification that
is palpably arbitrary. The rule often has been stated to be that
the classification 'must rest upon some ground of difference
having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legisla-
tion.'
54
While state laws are given a strong presumption of constitutionality
that presumption is rebuttable.
The question of whether a tax on plastic containers alone was
arbitarary or whether it actually furthered the purposes of the law
comprised the bulk of the New York litigation. There were exten-
sive and detailed submissions on the effect of plastics on the solid
waste problem. The court concluded that there was no rational
nexus between the objectives of the RIT and a tax solely on plastic
containers. The tax was therefore arbitrary and invalid. This result
is open to question. It is one thing to conclude that a law might not
be wise; it is wholly another to state that it has no rational basis.
52. Murphy and Rock, State and Local Taxation, 15 Syracuse L. Rev. 223, 227
(1963).
53. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, N.Y. CONST. art. I, sec. 11.
54. Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 527 (1959).
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While courts must at some time undertake to review the validity
of a legislative action they are loath to involve themselves in legisla-
tive functions. Generally, courts will overturn a state law only when
it involves a gross and obvious violation of rights. In Quaker City
Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania 5 the Supreme Court overturned a tax on
cab companies owned by non-residents. The Court concluded that
the residency of the owners of the cab companies was not related
to any valid aspect of the tax. It is this type of discrimination which
the courts seek to prevent.
The United States Supreme Court, in Williamson v. Lee Optical
Co.,56 reviewed a law which prohibited opticians from placing lens
in glasses without a prescription from an optometrist. This meant
that opticians could not even fit an old lens into new glasses. Con-
sidering the equal protection argument the court wrote
The problem of legislative classification is a perennial one, ad-
mitting of no doctrinaire definition. Evils in the same field
may be of different dimensions and proportions, requiring dif-
ferent remedies. Or so the legislature may think (cite). Or the
reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the
phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative
mind (cite). The legislature may select one phase of one field
and apply a remedy there, rejecting the other (cite). The pro-
hibition of the Equal Protection Clause goes not further than
the invidious discrimination. '5 7
Although the law "may exact a needless, wasteful requirement in
many cases""8 the Court refused to invalidate it.
It is not clear that the New York court applied the proper stand-
ards in judging the tax on plastic containers. However this does not




It is extremely difficult to estimate the impact of any tax on a
local economy. The range of effects is, of course, enormous. There
are, however, certain obvious concerns. When a tax with retail price
55. 277 U.S. 389 (1928).
56. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
57. Id. at 489.
58. Id. at 487.
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effect is instituted there will be a reduction in sales. This results not
only from a transfer of sales to neighboring jurisdictions but also
from a reduction in demand.
It is estimated that in New York City for every 1% increase in the
local retail sales tax there is a 6% loss in sales.59 While the RIT would
have a similar effect due to the inevitable rise in retail price, the
analogy is limited. The RIT with its numerous provisions for tax
credits would not produce a uniform tax on goods. Some items
would be affected more than others, and even within the same class
of goods utilization of the credits would mitigate the impact. Cer-
tainly some sales would be lost. The effect would be less than that
of a sales tax and more than no tax at all. Beyond that it is difficult
to predict.
As a counter to lost sales there will be an incentive for retailers
to deal with local suppliers. This support for local business comes
from the administrative provisions of the tax dealing with responsi-
bility for payment. Furthermore, the creation of a local demand for
recyclable material should promote the creation of a local "second-
ary materials" industry which is capable of fulfilling that demand.
In addition to container manufacturers, there are large numbers of
industries in a city which are capable of utilizing recyclable ma-
terials.
Another effect of concern is the impact of the tax on jobs. It is
expected that if the tax is effective jobs will be lost in the plastics
industry and among primary materials suppliers. It is also expected
that jobs will be gained in the recycling industry. Predicting whether
the net effect will be a gain or loss of jobs is a dangerous business. A
professor at the University of Illinois in estimating the impact of a
mandatory deposit bottle law in the state predicted a loss of 5,903
jobs and a gain of 7,397 jobs, for a net gain of 1,494 jobs. A similar
study by the Midwest Research Institute concluded that there
would be a loss of 66,000 jobs, a gain of 56,000 jobs, for a net loss
of 10,000 jobs." Whether jobs are gained or lost there are other
social considerations. If a thousand people were employed to destroy
priceless paintings, a law which forced them out of work might still
be considered appropriate.
There are provisions in the tax which attempt to mitigate potential
adverse economic impact. All industrial sales are exempt. Thus
59. McKinsey, supra note 5, at 2-5.
60. Brancato, supra note 6, at 155.
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there is no disincentive for industry to locate or remain in the city.
This should have a minimal impact on the objectives of the tax
since industrial containers are presumably minimal and functional.
Furthermore, the tax exempts pharmaceuticals and foods, although
not beverages or candies. While the tax is inevitably going to be
regressive this minimizes the effect by exempting the most im-
portant basic items. The regressiveness of the tax may be less than
feared since it is hoped that alternative packaging will appear at a
lesser price and tax rate.
Impact on containers
Will it work? Whether the tax will actually alter container design
depends on two considerations. First, how much leverage the par-
ticular market actually has, and second, what tax rate is sufficient
to influence behavior.
Analysis of the effectiveness of the RIT is rife with inferences
derived from a dearth of information. Nowhere was it possible to
find an adequate analysis of the percent of the market for various
containers that New York comprised. The McKinsey study was
replete with conjecture. Noting that New York is 3.85% of the na-
tional market the study suggests that this leverage "would be hard
for most area packagers and distributors to ignore." 1 In its analysis
of the impact of the tax on various materials, the study found that
the paperboard industry is dominated by large firms and that there-
fore "one would not expect a vigorous response. 62 The metal in-
dustry while largely national serves regional bottlers, and "a large
proportion of metal container users are sensitive to local market
conditions."63 Glass manufacturers operate regionally, and "at least
half of the glass entering New York City is made and used by man-
ufacturers for whom New York City sales are so significant that they
will probably find making the adjustments fostered by the tax's in-
centives worth while."64 Because of high competition and low entry
barriers the plastic industry's response "could be particularly
quick."65 All of these suggestions lack information on the actual
shape of the market in containers. It is difficult to form an estimate
61. McKinsey, supra note 5, at 3-7.
62. Id. at 3-20.
63. Id. at 3-30.
64. Id. at 3-36.
65. Id. at 3-44.
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of the potential effectiveness of the tax without such information.
The actual tax rate on each type of container was determined by
considering the degree of difficulty of disposal. The tax rate reflects
a rough ordering of materials based on their cost to the city. The
important consideration is not, however, the cost of disposal but
that amount which creates sufficient incentive to change the con-
tainers. It is suggested that there is extreme competition within the
container industry and that slight changes in costs of packaging can
produce shifts. Since the tax imposes costs generally greater than
that of the container itself the industry should be quick to respond.
It is obvious that the basic rationale of the RIT assumes that
capitalism works precisely and that consumers and manufacturers
are actually responsive to changes in price. The figures do not neces-
sarily suggest this. As noted previously, toiletries containers com-
prise 12% of the cost of the item while for cookies the figure is 10%.
This is an enormous amount of money. It is hard to believe that
these figures represent the minimum price for which it is possible
to package these goods. Economics indicates that companies would
begin to market their goods in cheaper containers and thereby in-
crease their share of sales. That this does not happen suggests that
there is strong consumer acceptance of expensive containers. The
frightening inference is that we have been conditioned to respond
to the packaging rather than the quality of the goods or the price.
Assuming consumers are willing to spend a considerable extra
amount for containers, is the one or two cent difference that the
RIT would impose sufficient to change consumer purchasing?
To some extent the use of more expensive containers implies that
they actually save money in other ways. Foam encased bottles re-
duce breakage and may therefore actually reduce costs. Plastic con-
tainers may reduce spoilage and thereby save money. To the extent
that costs have reached a precise equilibrim, with costs of more
expensive packaging balanced by money saved, then the gross fig-
ures used in the RIT will be sufficient to influence the market. To
the extent that there is "slack" representing insufficient consumer
attention or excess profits the market has the capacity to absorb
slight price increases without changing.
These problems may be more abstract than real. The plastic in-
dustry certainly argued that the RIT would affect them. Those
arguments, however, were in part due to the fact that it was not
the complete RIT and in part due to litigation strategy.
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CONCLUSION
There are numerous approaches to dealing with the problem of
solid wastes, and advances are being made in the areas of collection,
disposal and recycling. All solutions to these problems, however, are
intimately dependent on the initial quantity and composition of the
waste load, and a strategy of solid waste management which deals
with the fundamental problem must involve provisions for influenc-
ing that total load.
The RIT is a particularly attractive component of any plan to
deal with solid waste. First, it attempts to place the greatest burden
where there is the greatest harm. This is done, of course, by taxing
most heavily those materials which are the most expensive and
difficult to eliminate. Second, it provides great flexibility and re-
sponsiveness by allowing rates to change in response to changes in
new materials and new technology. Third, by promoting recycling
and minimal packaging it helps lessen the final amount of waste
with which we deal. Finally, it produces badly needed revenue for
the collection and disposal of solid wastes.
The RIT alone will not solve all solid waste problems. But
coupled with improved disposal technology it could bring the grow-
ing problem of solid wastes nearer to control.
Jeffrey M. Gaba
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APPENDIX I New York State
Recycling Incentive Tax-Enabling Act
Cities of One Million or More-Solid Waste Disposal,
Containers-Tax
CHAPTER 399
An Act to amend the tax law, by adding thereto provisions enabling any
city with a population of one million or more to impose taxes to pro-
mote the recycling of containers and reduce the cost of solid waste
disposal to such city.
Approved June 9, 1971, effective as provided in section 2.
Passed on message of necessity. See Const. art. IX, § 2(b) (2), and Mc-
Kinney's Legislative Law § 44.
The People of the State of New York, represented in Senate and
Assembly, do enact as follows:
Section 1. Section twelve hundred one of the tax law is hereby
amended by adding thereto a new subdivision, to be subdivision (f),
to read as follows:
(f) (1) Taxes on the sale of containers made in whole or in part of
rigid or semi-rigid paperboard, fibre, glass, metal, plastic or any com-
bination of such materials, including, but not limited to, barrels, baskets,
bottles, boxes, cans, cartons, carrying cases, crates, cups, cylinders,
drums, glasses, jars, jugs, pails, pots, rigid foil containers, trays, tubs,
tubes, tumblers, and vessels, intended for use in packing or packaging
any product intended for sale. Such taxes shall be levied upon the seller
or supplier of the container who or which makes sales thereof to the per-
son who purchases them (whether filled or unfilled) for the purpose
of using them in connection with and as part of sales at retail or who
receives them as containers of products intended for sale at retail.
Where no tax has been paid by such seller or supplier, the buyer or
person who purchases the container to use it or its contents in making
a sale at retail shall be liable for tax thereon upon purchasing such
container. Notwithstanding the provisions of section twelve hundred
twenty of this article, sellers and suppliers having no business situs
in the city imposing the tax, who sell such containers to retailers with-
in the city may pay the tax so as to prevent its levy upon such retailers.
Such taxes shall be imposed at rates not to exceed (i) three cents for
each plastic bottle, (ii) two cents for each other plastic container, (iii)
two cents for each glass container, (iv) two cents for each metal con-
tainer except one cent for metal containers shown to be made of one
metal only. Where a container is made of a combination of two or more
of the materials with which this subdivision deals, it shall be classified
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and be taxable as if it were made of that of its component materials for
which the following table provides the highest rate:
fibre and paperboard metal glass plastic
1¢ 2¢ 2¢ 3¢
(2) Any local law enacted pursuant to this subdivision may provide
that: (i) metal containers and paperboard or fibre containers which
have been impregnated, lined or coated with plastic or other materials
shall be considered to be classified and taxable as metal containers
and paperboard containers, respectively; (ii) paperboard or fibre con-
tainers with fastenings, tops and/or bottoms made of other materials
dealt with by this subdivision shall be classified and taxed as paper-
board or fibre containers; (iii) paperboard, metal, or plastic caps that
are easily, readily, usually, and customarily separated from the con-
tainer before disposal shall not be considered part of the container;
and (iv) notwithstanding any exception made pursuant to subpara-
graphs (i), (ii) and (iii) of this paragraph, where a preponderantly glass
container is made of a combination of taxable materials, the complete
separation of which materials is not easily, readily, usually and cus-
tomarily effected after use and before disposal, such container shall
be taxed one cent in addition to the tax otherwise imposed upon it, but in
no event shall the aggregate tax on such container exceed three cents.
(3) Any local law enacted pursuant to this subdivision may provide
that containers sold or furnished containing products intended for use in
manufacturing processes and not for final retail sale shall be exempt
from such taxes.
(4) Local laws imposing taxes authorized by this subdivision shall
provide for the allowance of credits against such taxes as follows:
(i) one cent for each taxable container if manufactured with the fol-
lowing minimum percentages of recycled material:
(A) Paperboard and fibre containers: eighty per cent, if made of
boxboard; thirty per cent if made of foodboard, fibre or container-
board.
(B) Metal containers: thirty per cent if taxed during the period
beginning July first, nineteen hundred seventy-one and ending June
thirtieth, nineteen hundred seventy-two; and forty per cent, if taxed
thereafter.
(C) Glass containers: twenty per cent if taxed during the period
beginning July first, nineteen hundred seventy-one and ending June
thirtieth, nineteen hundred seventy-two; and thirty per cent, if taxed
thereafter.
(D) Plastic containers: thirty per cent.
(ii) one cent for each container of a clearly distinct type, class, pat-
tern or form taxed during any taxable period provided that sixty per
cent or more of all the containers of such distinct type, class, pattern
or form subject to tax during such period were reused containers.
(iii) provided that the credits for each container during any taxable
period shall not exceed the amount of taxes due on such container for
such period.
(5) the fiscal officer of any such city in charge of the administration
of any tax imposed pursuant to this subdivision, may be authorized by
any local law enacted pursuant to this subdivision, to prescribe by
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regulation, upon the joint recommendation of the chief officer in charge
of the department or agency of such city dealing with the interests of
consumers and the chief officer in charge of the department or agency
of such city charged with the duty of waste collection and disposal:
(i) additional exemptions from and credits against the tax imposed
by such local law; and(ii) an additional surtax of no more than one cent per container,
to be imposed upon containers made of any of the taxable components
dealt with by this subdivision or any combination thereof.
In granting such exemption or credit or providing for such additional
surtax, the above mentioned officers shall take into consideration the
following qualities and characteristics of the container in question:
(A) the difficulty the container's material poses to the process of
making recycled material.
(B) the difficulty of its manufacture from recycled materials.
(C) the difficulty and relative cost of its disposal.
(D) any obstacle it poses to consumer protection.
(E) the degree to which the container can or cannot be reused.
(F) the slowness, difficulty, and incompleteness with which the con-
tainer degrades in the natural environment, either chemically or bio-
logically.
Any such exemption, credit or surtax may be revoked by joint action of
such officers, or by local law.
(6) There shall be exempted from any tax imposed pursuant to the
authority of this subdivision, containers used as receptacles for food,
food products, beverages, dietary foods and health supplements, sold
for human consumption but not including (i) candy and confectionery,
(ii) fruit drinks with contain less than seventy per cent of natural fruit
juice, (iii) soft drinks, sodas and beverages such as are ordinarily dis-
pensed at soda fountains or in connection therewith (other than coffee,
tea and cocoa) and (iv) beer, wine or other alcoholic beverages.
(7) When used in this subdivision the words (i) "recycled material"
mean component materials which have been derived from previously
used material or from new or old scrap material, (ii) "retail sale" or
"sale at retail" means a sale to any person for any purpose other than
for resale as such or as a physical component part of tangible personal
property, (iii) "taxable period" means each calendar month or such other
periods as the official administering any tax enacted pursuant to this
subdivision may provide for by regulation, (iv) "one metal only" means
metal with such minimum amounts of alloys as the officer charged with
the administration of any local law enacted pursuant to this subdivision
shall provide by regulation, but shall not include metal which has been
plated or lined with another metal. In formulating such regulations
such officer shall consult with the chief officer in charge of the depart-
ment or agency of such city dealing with the interests of consumers and
the chief officer in charge of the department or agency of such city
charged with the duty of waste collection and disposal and shall con-
sider the difficulty of using the metal in the making of recycled material
and the availability of or technical feasibility of manufacturing other
metals for the same purpose and use as the metal in question but with a
lower alloy content.
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§ 2. This act shall take effect July first, nineteen hundred seventy-
one, except that local laws may be adopted or amended pursuant to this
act before such date to take effect on or after July first, nineteen
hundred seventy-one.
APPENDIX II New York City
Version of Recycling Incentive Tax
LOCAL LAW No. 43
A local law to amend the administrative code of the city of New York,
in relation to raising revenue by imposing taxes on plastic containers
and to promote the recycling of such containers and reduce the cost
of solid waste disposal to the city.
Became a law with the approval of the mayor, June 30, 1971. Passed
by the local legislative body of the city of New York. Filed in the office
of the secretary of state June 30, 1971.
Be it enacted by the council as follows:
Section 1. Chapter forty-six of the administrative code of the city of
New York is hereby amended by adding thereto a new title, to be title
F, to follow title E, to read as follows:
TITLE F
TAX ON CONTAINERS
§ F46-1.0 Definitions. When used in this title, the following terms
shall mean and include:
1. "Person." An individual, partnership, society, association, joint stock
company, corporation, estate, receiver, trustee, assignee, referee, or any
other person acting in a fiduciary or representative capacity, whether
appointed by a court or otherwise and any combination of individuals
or of the foregoing.
2. "Container." Any article, thing or contrivance made in whole or in
part of rigid or semi-rigid plastic, including, but not limited to, barrels,
baskets, bottles, boxes, cartons, carrying cases, crates, cups, cylinders,
drums, jars, jugs, pails, pots, trays, tubs, tubes, tumblers, and vessels,
intended for use in packing or packaging any product intended for sale:
(a) Metal containers and paperboard or fiber containers which have
been impregnated, lined or coated with plastic or other materials shall
be considered to be classified as metal containers and paperboard con-
tainers, respectively;
(b) Paperboard or fiber containers with fastenings, tops and/or
bottoms made of plastic shall be classified as paperboard or fibre con-
tainers;
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(c) Plastic caps that are easily, readily, usually, and customarily
separated from the container before disposal shall not be considered
part of the container.
3. "Recycled material." Component materials which have been derived
from previously used material or from new or old scrap material.
4. "Taxable period." Such calendar period prescribed for filing returns
by this title or by the finance administrator.
5. "Retail sale" or "sale at retail." A sale to any person for any purpose
other than for resale as such or as a physical component part of tangible
personal property.
6. "Sale." The sale or furnishing of a container by a seller or supplier
to a retailer.
7. "Seller or supplier." Any person who sells containers to a retailer.
8. "Retailer." Any person who purchases containers (whether filled or
unfilled) for the purpose of using them in connection with and as part
of sales at retail or who receives them as containers of products intended
for sale at retail.
9. "City." The city of New York.
10. "Finance administrator." The finance administrator of the city.
11. "Comptroller." The comptroller of the city.
§ F46-2.0 Imposition of tax. On and after July first, nineteen hundred
seventy-one, there is hereby imposed within the city of New York and
there shall be paid a tax upon every sale of a plastic container at the
rate of two cents for each container sold.
2. A credit shall be allowed against the taxes imposed by this title of
one cent for each taxable container if manufactured with a minimum of
thirty per cent of recycled material.
§ F46-3.0. Presumptions and burden of proof. For the purpose of
proper administration of this title and to prevent evasion of the tax
hereby imposed, it shall be presumed that all sales of plastic containers
are taxable, and not entitled to any credit allowed against the taxes im-
posed hereby. Such presumptions shall prevail until the contrary is
established and the burden of proving the contrary shall be upon the
taxpayer.
§ F46-4.0. Payment of the tax. The tax imposed hereunder shall be
paid by the seller or supplier. However, where the tax has not been paid
on a sale by such seller or supplier, the retailer shall be liable for tax
thereon upon purchasing the container. Should sellers and supplier hav-
ing no business situs in the city, who sell containers to retailers within
the city, pay the tax, the retailer purchasing the containers shall not be
liable for the tax.
§F46-5.0. Records to be kept. Every seller or supplier and every
retailer shall keep records of all plastic containers taxed hereunder and
of all purchases and sales thereof and of the taxes due and payable on
the sale or on the purchase thereof, in such form as the finance admin-
istrator may by regulation require. Such records shall be available for
inspection and examination at any time upon demand by the finance
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administrator or his duly authorized agent or employee and shall be
preserved for a period of three years, except that the finance admini-
strator may consent to their destruction withirthat period or may require
that they be kept longer.
§ F.46-6.0. Exemptions. 1. The following shall be exempt from the
payment of the tax imposed by this title:
(a) The state of New York, or any of its agencies, instrumentalities,
public corporations (including a public corporation created pursuant to
agreement or compact with another state or Canada) or political sub-
divisions where it is the purchaser, user or consumer;
(b) The United States of America, and any of its agencies and in-
strumentalities insofar as it is immune from taxation where it is the
purchaser, user or consumer;
(c) The United Nations or other international organizations of which
the United States of America is a member; and
(d) Any corporation, or association, or trust, or community chest, fund
or foundation, organized and operated exclusively for religious, chari-
table, or educational purposes, or for the prevention of cruelty to children
or animals, and no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit
of any private shareholder or individual, and no substantial part of the
activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting
to influence legislation; provided, however, that nothing in this para-
graph shall include an organization operated for the primary purpose of
carrying on a trade or business for profit, whether or not all of its profits
are payable to one or more organizations described in this subdivision.
2. The following containers shall be exempt from the tax imposed by
this title:
a. Containers sold or furnished containing products intended for use
in manufacturing processes and not for final retail sale.
b. Containers used as receptacles for food, food products, beverages,
dietary foods and health supplements, sold for human consumption but
not including (i) candy and confectionery, (ii) fruit drinks which con-
tain less than seventy percent of natural fruit juice, (iii) soft drinks,
sodas and beverages such as are ordinarily dispensed at soda fountains
or in connection therewith (other than coffee, tea and cocoa) and (iv)
beer, wine or other alcoholic beverages.
§ F46-7.0. Returns. Every seller or supplier shall file with the finance
administrator a return of containers sold and of the taxes due and pay-
able thereon for the period from the day this tax takes effect until the
last day of September, nineteen hundred seventy-one and thereafter for
each of the four-monthly periods ending on the last day of January, May
and September of each year.
2. Every retailer shall file with the finance administrator a return of
containers purchased by him from sellers or suppliers having no situs
within the city and of the taxes due thereon for the same periods provid-
ed in subdivision one of this section.
3. The returns shall be filed within twenty days after the end of the
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periods covered thereby. The finance administrator may permit or re-
quire returns to be made for other periods and upon such dates as he
may specify. If the finance administrator deems it necessary in order to
insure the payment of the tax imposed by this title, he may require re-
turns to be made for shorter periods than those prescribed pursuant to
the foregoing provisions of this subdivision and upon such dates as he
may specify.
4. The forms of returns shall be prescribed by the finance administrator
and shall contain such information as he may deem necessary for the
proper administration of this title. The finance administrator may require
amended returns to be filed within twenty days after notice and to con-
tain the information specified in the notice.
5. If a return required by this title is not filed or if a return when filed
is incorrect or insufficient on its face the finance administrator shall take
the necessary steps to enforce the filing of such a return or a corrected
return.
§ F46-8.0. Determination of tax. If a return required by this title is
not filed, or if a return when filed is incorrect or insufficient, the amount
of tax due shall be determined by the finance administrator from such
information as may be obtainable and, if necessary, the tax may be
estimated on the basis of external indices, such as volume of sales, in-
ventories, purchases of containers, or of raw materials, production figures,
and/or other factors. Notice of such determination shall be given to the
person liable for the collection and/or payment of the tax. Such de-
termination shall finally and irrevocably fix the tax unless the person
against whom it is assessed, within thirty days after giving notice of
such determination, shall apply to the finance administrator for a hear-
ing, or unless the finance administrator of his own motion shall re-
determine the same. After such hearing the finance administrator shall
give notice of his determination to the person against whom the tax is
assessed. The determination of the finance administrator shall be review-
able for error, illegality or unconstitutionality or any other reason what-
soever by a proceeding under article seventy-eight of the Civil Practice
Law and Rules if application therefor is made to the Supreme Court
within four months after the giving of the notice of such determination.
A proceeding under article seventy-eight of the Civil Practice Law and
Rules shall not be instituted unless (a) the amount of any tax sought to
be reviewed, with penalties and interest thereon, if any, shall be first
deposited with the finance administrator and there shall be filed with
the finance administrator an undertaking, issued by a surety company
authorized to transact business in this state and approved by the super-
intendent of insurance of this state as to solvency and responsibility, in
such amount as a justice of the Supreme Court shall approve to the ef-
fect that if such proceeding be dismissed or the tax confirmed, the peti-
tioner will pay all costs and charges which may accrue in the prosecu-
tion of the proceeding; or (b) at the option of the applicant such
undertaking filed with the finance administrator may be in a sum suf-
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ficient to cover the taxes, penalties and interest thereon stated in such
determination plus the costs and charges which may accrue against it in
the prosecution of the proceeding, in which event the applicant shall not
be required to deposit such taxes, penalties and interest as a condition
precedent to the application.
§ F46-9.0. Refunds. a. In the manner provided in this section the
finance administrator shall refund or credit, without interest, any tax,
penalty or interest erroneously, illegally or unconstitutionally collected
or paid if application to the finance administrator for such refund shall
be made within one year from the payment thereof. Whenever a refund
is made by the finance administrator, he shall state his reasons therefor in
writing. Such application may be made by the seller or supplier or the
retailer or other person who has actually paid the tax. The finance ad-
ministrator may, in lieu of any refund required to be made, allow credit
therefor on payments due from the applicant.
b. An application for a refund or credit made as herein provided shall
be deemed an application for revision of any tax, penalty or interest
complained of. If the finance administrator, prior to any hearing held,
initially denies the application for refund, he shall give notice of such
determination of denial to the applicant. Such determination shall be final
and irrevocable unless the applicant, within thirty days after the giving
of notice of such determination, shall apply to the finance administrator
for a hearing, or unless the finance administrator of his own motion shall
redetermine the same. After such hearing the finance administrator shall
give fiotice of his determination to the applicant, who shall be entitled to
review such determination by a proceeding pursuant to article seventy-
eight of the Civil Practice Law and Rules, provided such proceeding is
instituted within four months after the giving of the notice of such
determination, and provided that a final determination of tax was not
previously made. Such a proceeding shall not be instituted unless an
undertaking is filed with the finance administrator in such amount and
with such sureties as a justice of the Supreme Court shall approve to the
effect that if such proceeding be dismissed or the tax confirmed, the
petitioner shall pay all costs and charges which may accrue in the
prosecution of such proceeding.
c. A person shall not be entitled to a revision, refund or credit under
this section of a tax, interest or penalty which had been determined to
be due pursuant to the provisions of section F46-8.0 of this title where
he has had a hearing or an opportunity for a hearing, as provided in
said section, or has failed to avail himself of the remedies therein pro-
vided. No refund or credit shall be made of a tax, interest or penalty
paid after a determination by the finance administrator made pursuant
to section F46-7.0 of this title unless it be found that such determination
was erroneous, illegal or unconstitutional or otherwise improper, by the
finance administrator after a hearing or of his own motion, or in a pro-
ceeding under article seventy-eight of the Civil Practice Law and Rules,
pursuant to the provisions of said section, in vhich event refund or
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credit without interest shall be made of the tax, interest or penalty found
to have been overpaid.
§ F46-10.0 Reserves. In cases where the seller or supplier or the
retailer has applied for a fund and has instituted a proceeding under
article seventy-eight of the Civil Practice Law and Rules to review a
determination adverse to him on his application for refund, the controller
shall set up appropriate reserves to meet any decision adverse to the city.
§ F46-11.0 Remedies exclusive. The remedies provided by sections
F46-8.0 and F46-9.0 of this title shall be the exclusive remedies available
to any person for the review of tax liability imposed by this title; and no
determination or proposed determination of tax or determination on any
application for refund shall be enjoined or reviewed by an action for
declaratory judgment, an action for money had and received or by any
action or proceeding other than a proceeding in the nature of a certiorari
proceeding under article seventy-eight of the Civil Practice Law and
Rules; provided, however, that a taxpayer may proceed by declaratory
judgment if he institutes suit within thirty days after a deficiency assess-
ment is made and pays the amount of the deficiency assessment to the
finance administrator prior to the institution of such suit and posts a
bond for costs as provided in section F46-8.0 of this title.
§ F46-12.0. Proceedings to recover tax. a. Whenever any seller or
supplier or retailer or other person shall fail to pay any tax, penalty or
interest imposed by this title as therein provided, the corporation counsel
shall, upon the request of the finance administrator bring or cause to be
brought an action to enforce the payment of the same on behalf of the
city of New York in any court of the state of New York or of any other
state or of the United States. If, however, the finance administrator in
his discretion believes that any such seller or supplier or retailer or other
person is about to cease business, leave the state or remove or dissipate
the assets out of which the tax, penalties or interest might be satisfied,
and that any such tax, penalty or interest will not be paid when due, he
may declare such tax, penalty or interest to be immediately due and
payable and may issue a warrant immediately.
b. As an additional or alternate remedy, the finance administrator may
issue a warrant, directed to the city sheriff commanding him to levy upon
and sell the real and personal property of the seller or supplier or retailer
or other person liable for the tax, which may be found within the city,
for the payment of the amount thereof, with any penalties and interest,
and the cost of executing the warrant, and to return such warrant to the
finance administrator and to pay to him the money collected by virtue
thereof within sixty days after the receipt of such warrant. The city
sheriff shall within five days after the receipt of the warrant file with the
county clerk a copy thereof, and thereupon such clerk shall enter in the
judgment docket the name of the person mentioned in the warrant and
the amount of the tax, penalties and interest for which the warrant is
issued and the date when such copy is filed. Thereupon the amount of
such warrant so docketed shall become a lien upon the title to and in-
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terest in real and personal property of the person against whom the
warrant is issued. The city sheriff shall then proceed upon the warrant,
in the same manner, and with like effect, as that provided by law in
respect to executions issued against property upon judgments of a court
of record, and for services in executing the warrant he shall be entitled
to the same fees, which he may collect in the same manner. In the
discretion of the finance administrator a warrant of like terms, force and
effect may be issued and directed to any officer or employee of the
finance administration, and in the execution thereof such officer or em-
ployee shall have all the powers conferred by law upon sheriffs, but shall
be entitled to no fee or compensation in excess of the actual expenses
paid in the performance of such duty. If a warrant is returned not satis-
fied in full, the finance administrator may from time to time issue new
warrants and shall also have the same remedies to enforce the amount
due thereunder as if the city had recovered judgment therefor and execu-
tion thereon had been returned unsatisfied.
c. Whenever a seller or supplier or the retailer shall make a sale, trans-
fer, or assignment in bulk of any part of the whole of his fixtures, or of
his stock of merchandise, or of stock or merchandise and of fixtures per-
taining to the conduct or operation of business of the seller or supplier
or the retailer, otherwise than in the ordinary course of trade and regular
prosecution of business, the purchaser, transferee or assignee shall at least
ten days before taking possession of the subject of said sale, transfer or
assignment, or paying therefor, notify the finance administrator by reg-
istered mail of the proposed sale and of the price, terms and conditions
thereof whether or not the seller, transferrer or assignor, has represented
to, or informed the purchaser, transferee or assignee that it owes any tax
pursuant to this title, and whether or not the purchaser, transferee or
assignee has knowledge that such taxes are owing, and whether any such
taxes are in fact owing.
Whenever the purchaser, transferee or assignee shall fail to give notice
to the finance administrator as required by the preceding paragraph, or
whenever the finance administrator shall inform the purchaser, transferee
or assignee that a possible claim for such tax or taxes exists, any sums of
money, property or choses in action, or other consideration, which the
purchaser, transferee or assignee is required to transfer over to the seller,
transferrer or assignor shall be subject to a first priority right and lien for
any such taxes theretofore or thereafter determined to be due from the
seller, transferrer or assignor to the city, and the purchaser, transferee or
assignee is forbidden to transfer to the seller, transferrer or assignor any
such sums of money, property or choses in action to the extent of the
amount of the city's claim. For failure to comply with the provisions of
this subdivision, the purchaser, transferee or assignee, in addition to
being subject to the liabilities and remedies imposed under the provisions
of article six of the Uniform Commercial Code, shall be personally liable
for the payment to the city of any such taxes theretofore or thereafter
determined to be due to the city from the seller, transferrer or assignor,
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and such liability may be assessed and enforced in the same manner as
the liability for tax under this title.
§ F46-13.0. General powers of the finance administrator. In addition
to the powers granted to the finance administrator in this title, he is
hereby authorized and empowered:
1. To make, adopt and amend rules and regulations appropriate to the
carrying out of this title and the purposes thereof;
2. To extend, for cause shown, the time of filing any return for a period
not exceeding thirty days; and for cause shown, to remit penalties but
not interest computed at the rate of six percent per annum; and to com-
promise disputed claims in connection with the taxes hereby imposed;
3. To request information from the tax commission of the state of New
York or the treasury department of the United States relative to any
person; and to afford information to such tax commission or such treasury
department relative to any person, any other provision of this title to the
contrary notwithstanding;
4. To delegate his functions hereunder to a deputy administrator, as-
sistant administrator, commissioner or deputy commissioner in the fiance
administration or to any employee or employees of the finance adminis-
trator;
5. To prescribe methods for determining the containers sold or sup-
plied or purchased and to determine which are taxable and nontaxable.
6. To require sellers and suppliers and retailers within the city to keep
detailed records with respect to containers bought, sold, used, manufac-
tured or produced, and stock and production records with respect to
such containers whether or not subject to the tax imposed by this title,
and to furnish any information with respect thereto upon request to the
finance administrator;
7. To assess, determine, revise and readjust the taxes imposed under
this title.
§ F46-14.0. Administration of oaths and compelling testimony. a. The
finance administrator or his employees or agents duly designated and
authorized by him shall have power to administer oaths and take affi-
davits in relation to any matter or proceeding in the exercise of their
powers and duties under this title. The finance administrator shall have
power to subpoena and require the attendance of witnesses and the
production of books, papers and documents to secure information perti-
nent to the performance of his duties hereunder and of the enforcement
of this title and to examine them in relation thereto, and to issue com-
missions for the examination of witnesses who are out of the state or
unable to attend before him or excused from attendance.
b. A justice of the Supreme Court either in court or at chambers shall
have power summarily to enforce by proper proceedings the attendance
and testimony of vitnesses and the production and examination of books,
papers and documents called for by the subpoena of the finance adminis-
trator under this title.
c. Any person who shall refuse to testify or to produce books or records
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or who shall testify falsely in any material matter pending before the
finance administrator under this title shall be guilty of a misdemeanor,
punishment for which shall be a fine of not more than one thousand
dollars or imprisonment for not more than one year, or both such fine
and imprisonment.
d. The officers who serve the summons or subpoena of the finance
administrator and witnesses attending in response thereto shall be en-
titled to the same fees as are allowed to officers and witnesses in civil
cases in courts of record, except as herein otherwise provided. Such
officers shall be the city sheriff and his duly appointed deputies or any
officers or employees of the finance administration, designated to serve
such process.
§ F46-15.0. Penalties and interest, a. Any person failing to file a
return or to pay any tax to finance administrator within the time required
by this title shall be .subject to a penalty of five percent of the amount
of tax due; plus interest at the rate of one percent of such tax for each
month of delay excepting the first month after such return was required
to be filed or such tax became due; but the finance administrator if
satisfied that the delay was excusable, may remit all or any part of such
penalty, but not interest at the rate of six percent per year. Such penalties
and interest shall be paid and disposed of in the same manner as other
revenues from this title. Unpaid penalties and interest may be enforced
in the same manner as the tax imposed by this title.
b. Any seller or supplier or any retailer or any officer of a corporate
seller or supplier or retailer, failing to file a return as required by this
title, or filing or causing to be filed or making or causing to be made or
given or causing to be given any return, certificate, affidavit, representa-
tion, information, testimony or statement required or authorized by this
title which is willfully false, and any seller or supplier or any retailer or
any officer of a corporate seller or supplier or retailer failing to keep the
records required by subdivision six of section F46-13.0 of this title, shall,
in addition to the penalties herein or elsewhere prescribed, be guilty of a
misdemeanor, punishment for which shall be a fine of not more than one
thousand dollars or imprisonment for not more than one year, or both
such fine and imprisonment. It shall not be any defense to a prosecution
under this subdivision that the failure to file a return or that the actions
or failures to act mentioned in this subdivision was unintentional or not
willful.
c. The certificate of the finance administrator to the effect that a tax
has not been paid, that a return has not been filed, or that information
has not been supplied pursuant to the provisions of this title, shall be
presumptive evidence thereof.
§ F46-16.0. Return to be secret, a. Except in accordance with proper
judicial order, or as otherwise provided by law, it shall be unlawful for
the finance administrator, any officer or employee of the finance ad-
ministration, any person engaged or retained on an independent contract
basis or any person who, pursuant to this section is permitted to inspect
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any return or to whom a copy, an abstract or a portion of any return
is furnished, or to whom any information contained in any return is
furnished, to divulge or make known in any manner any information con-
tained in or relating to any return required under this title. The officers
charged with the custody of such returns shall not be required to produce
any of them or evidence of anything contained in them in any action or
proceeding in any court, except on behalf of the finance administrator
in an action or proceeding under the provisions of this title, or on behalf
of any party to any action or proceeding under the provisions of this
title, when the returns or facts shown thereby are directly involved in
such action or proceeding, in either of which events the court may resuire
the production of, and may admit in evidence, so much of said returns
or of the facts shown thereby, as are pertinent to the action or proceed-
ing and no more. Nothing herein shall be construed to prohibit the
delivery to a taxpayer or his duly authorized representative of a certified
copy of any return filed in connection with his tax; nor to prohibit the
delivery of such a certified copy of such return or of any information
contained in or relating thereto, the United States of America or any de-
partment thereof, to the state of New York or any department thereof, or
to any agency or department of the city of New York, provided the same
is requested for official business; nor to prohibit the inspection for of-
ficial business of such returns by the corporation counsel or other legal
representatives of the city or by the district attorney of any county within
the city; nor to prohibit the publication of statistics so classified as to
prevent the identification of particular returns and the items thereof. Re-
turns shall be preserved for three years and thereafter until the finance
administrator permits them to be destroyed.
b. Any violation of subdivision a of this section shall be punishable by
a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not ex-
ceeding one year, or both, in the discretion of the court, and if the of-
fender be an officer or employee of the city he shall be dismissed from
office and be incapable of holding any public office for a period of five
years thereafter.
§ F46-17.0. Notices and limitations of time. a. Any notice authorized
or required under the provisions of this title may be given by mailing the
same to the person for whom it is intended in a postpaid envelope ad-
dressed to such person at the address given in the last return filed by him
pursuant to the provisions of this title or in any application made by him
or, if no return has been filed or application made, then to such address
as may be obtainable. The mailing of such notice shall be presumptive
evidence of the receipt of the same by the person to whom addressed.
Any period of time which is determined according to the provisions of
this title by the giving of notice shall commence to run from the date of
mailing of such notice.
b. The provisions of the Civil Practice Law and Rules or any other law
relative to limitations of time for the enforcement of a civil remedy shall
not apply to any proceeding or action taken by the city to levy, appraise,
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assess, determine or enforce the collection of any tax or penalty provided
by this title. However, except in the case of a willfully false or fraudulent
return with intent to evade the tax, no assessment of additional tax shall
be made after the expiration of more than three years from the date of
the filing of a return; provided, however, that where no return has been
filed as provided by law the tax may be assessed at any time.
c. Where, before the expiration of the period prescribed herein for
assessment of an additional tax, a taxpayer has consented in writing that
such period be extended, the amount of such additional tax due may be
determined at any time within such extended period. The period so ex-
tended may be further extended by subsequent consents in writing made
before the expiration of the extended period.
§ F46-18.0. Construction and enforcement. This title shall be con-
strued and enforced in conformity with chapter three hundred ninety-
nine of the laws of nineteen hundred seventy-one, pursuant to Which it
is enacted.
§ F46-19.0. Separability. In any provision of this title, or the applica-
tion thereof to any person or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder
of this title, and the application of such provisions to other persons or
circumstances shall not be affected thereby.
§ 2. This local law shall take effect July first, nineteen hundred seventy-
one.
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